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Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will
often develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange
opportunities. This appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions
can be cheaply communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists
is the observation that anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached
trust, often make effective use of cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to
encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of trust games with one-way communication
and an emotion survey to investigate the role of emotions in regulating the propensity
to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate trustworthiness. This design
allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant
behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their effects on behavior, and
subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction outcomes are
predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of
emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they
can be trusted, and when trust will be re-extended.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we explore the role of positive emotions (pride,
believability, appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, happiness)
and negative emotions (guilt, shame, anger, disgust, aggrava-
tion, frustration) in regulating cheap signaling, trust re-extension,
and trustworthy behavior in the wake of a veiled trust-based
interaction between strangers with no explicit indication of
certain expectation for repeated interaction1. Interactions with
1A number of other behavioral economic studies have also used veiled designs
where interacting participants are unaware of opportunity for repeated inter-
action(s) that will later be made available (e.g., see Binmore et al., 1985;
Burnham et al., 2000; Ellingsen et al., 2010; Gambetta and Székely, 2014).
Ellingsen et al. (2010, p. 96) discuss why the veiled design avoiding deception
by commission does not violate the non-deception norm in behavioral eco-
nomic experiments and why withholding procedural information may serve
to limit undesirable experimenter demand. Nevertheless, because there is no
clear agreement among economists as to what kinds of deception are taboo
(see survey results by Krawczyk, 2013 and discussion byWilson, 2014), decep-
tion by omission remains a potential concern with our design. Veiled designs
may create negative externality in that the next time participants return to
the laboratory to participate in other studies, they may question whether they
should anticipate unannounced tasks or interactions, unless the instructions
explicitly exclude such a possibility (see also Davis and Holt, 1993, pp. 23–24;
Wilson, 2014). It is unlikely that our design produced these externalities, how-
ever, as we followed the procedural norm for conducting research with our
participant pool by specifying the expected session duration, making a clear
statement about the experimental game which was the final one in the ses-
sion, and indicating when payments would be issued. We discuss in the design
section how future studies using veiled designs can make improvements over
strangers have presented recurrent adaptive problems over the
course of human evolutionary history (Fehr and Henrich, 2003)
and are common in modern society, especially in global mar-
kets (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Seabright, 2010). Sometimes
unexpected opportunities for repeated exchange with previously
cooperative or uncooperative partners arise2. Once exchange his-
tories establish, partners with mutually beneficial non-binding
agreements often reap gains from iterated trust-based trade
with one another (Cochard et al., 2004; Boero et al., 2009;
Kaplan et al., 2012). However, investors ceding resources (in
anticipation of desired returns) remain subject to various
kinds of exploitation by previously trusted partners. Partners
who demonstrated trustworthiness in the past might subse-
quently engage in Machiavellian manipulations (Humphrey,
1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1988) by sending false signals about
intentions to engage in future trustworthy behavior. Upon
being re-extended trust, these previously trusted partners can
ours to avoid omitting important details—namely, whether subsequent tasks
are scheduled as part of the session.
2While transactions with strangers may have been full of danger, mistrust,
and exploitation for much of human evolutionary history (Diamond, 1997;
Bowles, 1998), at least more recently, since the 19th century, as modern mar-
ket society and per capita income have grown (Clark, 2008), the norm of
exchange has moved from more exclusively personal to more anonymous
(North, 1990). Market proliferation, in turn, has reinforced learning of the
notion that trust in strangers brings benefits, resulting in greater trustwor-
thiness (Henrich et al., 2001, 2010; Zak and Knack, 2001; Al-Ubaydli et al.,
2013).
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opportunistically exploit their positions3. Alternatively, if a part-
ner was previously untrustworthy (e.g., breaking a promise and
not returning profits on investment) but claims to have inten-
tions and propensity for future trustworthiness, an investor
must decide whether to forgo potential gains from future trust-
based exchange (by not re-extending trust) or else pursue the
available opportunity with that previously untrustworthy part-
ner, at the risk of being repeatedly deceived or exploited4 .
While much attention has been given to the production and
evaluation of cues and signals affecting novel trust exten-
sion, less attention has been given to the dilemma of trust
re-extension and the role of emotions in regulating relevant
behaviors.
The ability to integrate evaluations of reputation from cues
and signal quality, infer a partner’s propensity toward future
trustworthiness, and accordingly regulate trust re-extension
would have been a highly advantageous trait over the course of
human evolutionary history and should continue to be in mod-
ern economies. Evolutionary theories of emotions (Nesse, 1990;
Tooby and Cosmides, 1990; Haselton and Ketelaar, 2006; Tooby
et al., 2008; Schniter and Shields, 2013) have proposed that key
emotions have been selected to assist us in accomplishing these
tasks. We test the propositions that new information about trust-
based interaction outcomes triggers emotions, and that, when
experienced, these emotions regulate re-affirmative and remedial
behaviors, and the propensity to re-extend trust.
To study the predictors of emotions and the effects of emo-
tions on spontaneous messaging and trust re-extension, we
conducted a non-deceptive study wherein financially motivated
participants used endogenously created and naturally distributed
promises and messages. Our study is based on a version of the
“investment game” by Berg et al. (1995). In our experiments
trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent
returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally
trustees decided how much to return. Since investing money
is risky, investments are usually interpreted as trust. Likewise,
because voluntary returns are costly to trustees, the delivery of
promised returns on investment (ROI) is interpreted as evidence
of trustworthiness. We also administered a 20 item survey in
which participants reported their emotional status as a conse-
quence of the decisions and interaction outcomes that they just
experienced5. After an unexpected second game was announced,
but before it commenced, trustees could send a one-way message.
3McNally and Tanner (2011) speculated that under conditions of “an unfor-
giving Machiavellian society,” one-shot cooperation is most likely to evolve.
4As suggested by the phrase “. . . fool me twice, shame on me,” there may be
stronger hedonic costs to being a targeted victim of repeated deception, than
are experienced after being a first-time victim.
5In this study we focus on 12 emotions that had previously been shown to
be affected by trust-based exchange outcomes (Schniter and Shields, 2013;
Schniter et al., 2014). However, to avoid demand effects that might result by
focusing participants only on the 12 emotions of interest to our study, and
to limit post-rationalization that might result from inducing a more limited
focus, we presented subjects with a larger number of 20 emotions. This set
of 20 emotions is frequently used in versions of the one-dimensional Positive
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS), a self-report measure of positively and
negatively valenced affect state activations developed by Watson et al. (1988)
This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence
and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, consequent
emotions, and focus on these emotions’ effects on trustees’
naturally occurring communication strategies, investors’ trust
re-extension, and trustee’s trustworthiness.
While results on the observed frequencies of game behaviors
in both trust games of this study are reported in the Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization (Schniter et al., 2013), we
did not previously examine the role of emotions. In this paper we
evaluate reports of emotions and their role in regulating behaviors
relevant to the dilemma of trust re-extension.
BACKGROUND
Despite normative predictions, trust is often developed in experi-
mental one-shot environments with unrelated strangers (Dawes
and Thaler, 1988; Kiyonari et al., 2000; McCabe et al., 2003;
Krasnow et al., 2013), especially when facilitated by cheap talk and
emotions (Frank, 1988, 2004; McElreath et al., 2003; Schweitzer
et al., 2006; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009; Ben-Ner et al., 2011;
Gambetta and Székely, 2014; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2014). In this
section we provide some background on three important litera-
tures to which our research links: the first concerns trust-based
exchange dilemmas and the evolution of cooperation, the second
concerns cheap signaling and trust re-extension, and the third
concerns the role of recalibrational emotions in cheap signaling
and trust re-extension.
When taking into account the observation that people exist
and have long existed under the uncertain but ever present
shadow of possible future interactions with others, the propen-
sity to trust (despite hazards for opportunism) may bring net
exchange benefits6. Under such conditions natural selection may
have favored those with the propensity to cooperate even when
exposed to indicators that interactions were one-shot and inter-
action partners were unknown (Delton et al., 2011; Krasnow
et al., 2013). Sayings like “you always meet twice in a lifetime,”
“you haven’t seen the last of me,” and “dangerous enemies will
meet again in narrow streets” seem to provide justification for
the human tendency to treat others as if they will be beneficial
exchange partners or threats in the future, despite the absence
of cues assuring there will be repeated interaction. The one-shot
investment game (Berg et al., 1995) that models the opportunity
to develop and allocate gains through exchange, has shown time
and again that people exposed to one-shot sequential exchange
opportunities with anonymous others tend to behave in a mutu-
ally beneficial way (for reviews see Ostrom and Walker, 2005;
Balliet and Van Lange, 2012) despite the normative proscription
from game theory: do not cooperate because your partner will not
cooperate.
In the absence of information about past behavior, “cheap”
messages (bearing little in the way of up-front costs for
production) are often sent to receivers with the intention of
that has been demonstrated across large non-clinical samples to be a reliable
and valid measure of these states (Crawford and Henry, 2004).
6Human psychological adaptations for sociality likely evolved under a selec-
tive regime characterized by repeated interactions among known others
(Kelly, 1995).
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communicating information about the sender (e.g., see Farrell
and Rabin, 1996). For example, non-binding promises (of
intended trustworthiness) have been shown to increase coopera-
tion (Rubin and Brown, 1975; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994;
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Sutter, 2009). Where demonstrated behavior has informed
investors of a trustee’s untrustworthiness, messages may be sent
with the intention of persuading investors that the trustee is more
trustworthy than inferred from cues alone. Many find it quite
puzzling that so-called “cheap signals” can effectively be used
to negotiate trust between individuals with conflicting interests
(Lachmann et al., 2001) and that it is even possible for promise-
breakers to rebuild damaged trust by issuing apologies (Schniter
et al., 2013). Below we review why trust can be built with the
help of cheap-to-produce messages and why those who re-extend
trust to previously untrustworthy individuals (e.g., to promise
breakers) may take their messages into consideration.
Cheap-to-produce messages can maintain their reliability
because they often end up being “costly” after being used to
deceive (Schniter et al., 2013). Through reputational sanctions
or exclusion from future interactions, receivers of deceptively
used cheap signals can impose ex post costs greater than the
benefits initially derived from deceptively using those signals
(Rohwer, 1977; Masclet et al., 2003; Schweitzer et al., 2006)—
therebymaintaining signal reliability in the society in which it was
used.
Though it has been studied little, it is reasonable to expect
that the psychological machinery designed to produce and eval-
uate cheap signals is attuned to the experience and perception
of emotions. Emotions are important components of message
composition, speech production and perception, and face-to-face
communication. Personal communication in various forms is
known to improve cooperation (Orbell et al., 1988; Bohnet and
Frey, 1999; Ridings et al., 2002; Zheng et al., 2002; Buchan et al.,
2006; Cason et al., 2012) by facilitating coordination, decreasing
social distance, raising solidarity, and providing the cues of famil-
iarity that are normally associated with trustworthy relationships.
Smith (1759) wrote of the “fellow feeling” that can be generated,
for example as a consequence of sharing in another’s emotional
state, and being part of the process of improving it. According to
Smith, the capacity to experience the pleasurable “fellow feeling”
is based on our ability tomodel another’s circumstances and emo-
tional reaction to them, and to internally simulate (sympathize
with) the emotional feelings that they might derive. When mes-
sages are produced7, they are often assembled with verbiage meant
to demonstrate regard for the recipient, persuade a change in the
recipient’s perspectives, and provide information of the signaler’s
intentions and emotional experiences: things which may not be
otherwise known (Pennebaker and Graybeal, 2001). Though the
messages we consider guarantee no honest information, their
length is a potential indication of the effort invested into an
7Messaging is often an option (i.e., not compulsory). When optional, we
expect people to tradeoff costs and benefits. Messaging may not be chosen
for a variety of reasons including: to minimize cognitive effort, in an attempt
to manage impressions, to save time, to pursue alternative opportunities that
otherwise might be forgone.
attempt to communicate these potentially unknown things. On
the other hand, where messages are intended as re-affirmations
of known things (e.g., recent cooperation), their length is not as
necessary. Thus, to understand the human ecology of cheap sig-
nal production and evaluation, one should also understand the
dynamic triggering of emotions and their targeted effects on the
propensity to engage in communication.
According to the recalibrational theory of emotions, when
evolved psychological machinery has computationally identified
adaptive problems (such as resulting from social dilemma out-
comes), emotional responses are triggered that encourage recal-
ibration of behavior regulation programs (Tooby et al., 2008;
Schniter and Shields, 2013; Schniter et al., 2014). As such, emo-
tions are hedonic components of a learning system that integrates
relevant experiences to inform individual decisions and interac-
tion behaviors. Emotions are often relatively “automatic,” difficult
to control, and distinct from cogitative non-emotional learning8.
When triggered, emotional responses typically produce sudden
physiological changes (e.g., arousal) and affect facial expres-
sion, posture, subjective experience and perception, and action
tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990).
Consistent with recalibrational theories of emotions, we
hypothesize that emotions integrate new information about
trust-based interaction outcomes, providing hedonic feedback
that people experience as either positively valenced (pleasantly
motivating continuation of prior behaviors associated with its
occurrence) or negatively valenced (unpleasantly motivating dis-
engagement and pursuit of alternative strategies). It is hypothe-
sized that this positive or negative emotional feedback is designed
to motivate changes to behavioral propensities so as to enhance
success in future relationships characterized by similar cooper-
ation dilemmas. For example, when a trust-based relationship
has been developed and assured, good feelings such as pride and
appreciation are experienced (Schniter and Shields, 2013; Schniter
et al., 2014). As a result, proud trustees may be more inclined
to re-affirm the good relationship and demonstrate more trust-
worthiness (Nesse, 1990; Fessler, 1999, 2001), and appreciative or
grateful investors may be more likely to trust the trustee’s cheap
signals and re-extend trust (Hirshleifer, 1987; McCullough et al.,
2001; Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Algoe et al., 2008; Tooby and
Cosmides, 2008). Alternatively, when a trustee has demonstrated
untrustworthy behavior (breaking a promise or exploiting an
investor) the investor may experience anger and frustration (e.g.,
see Ortony et al., 1988; Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005) while the
trustee experiences guilt, and shame (e.g., see Baumeister et al.,
1994; Smith et al., 2002; Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Sznycer, 2010;
Sznycer et al., 2012). Angry and frustrated investor’s may be more
8Despite being difficult to control, people regularly make efforts to control
their experience of emotions and the effects of those emotions on decision
making processes (Gross, 2002). Indeed, it has been shown that an individ-
ual’s ability to effectively control their emotions has implications for their
decision making processes under uncertain conditions (Heilman et al., 2010).
While individual differences in degree of emotional regulation likely explain
some variance in the behaviors that we explore with this study, our recalibra-
tional model is not a model of individual differences. Rather, we study the
different kinds of emotional adaptations that should have reliably predictable
directional effects among all people.
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likely to distrust subsequent promises or offers from the untrust-
worthy trustee (e.g., see Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Dunn and
Schweitzer, 2005), and more likely to impose costs or restrict ben-
efits (e.g., see Sell et al., 2009). A guilty or shameful trustee may
be motivated to make remedial efforts (e.g., issuing a persuasive
message or apology) targeting the affected investor—especially
when there is possibility of future trust-based exchange oppor-
tunity with this potentially angry investor (Fessler, 2001; Sznycer,
2010; de Hooge et al., 2011; Sznycer et al., 2012). Apology has
been demonstrated to be a particularly effective remedial signal
that encourages a victim to trust again by expressing responsi-
bility for an offense and possibly the promise of forbearance, an
offer of condolence, or repair (Scher and Darley, 1997; Ho, 2012;
Fischbacher and Utikal, 2013; Schniter et al., 2013).
Emotionally affected speech and facial expression have long
been believed to have some “honest signal” features revealing
underlying emotional states (Darwin, 1872/1965). A century after
Darwin, researchers began making a strong case that basic human
emotions are not only universal in their distinct facial and vocal
expressions, but also that the identification of these emotions
exists and is consistent across humans. Evidently, humans can
accurately recognize many basic emotions (e.g., happiness, sur-
prise, sadness, fear, disgust, and anger) across quite different
cultures in faces (Ekman et al., 1969), voices (Bryant and Barrett,
2008; Sauter et al., 2010), and writtenmessages (Xiao andHouser,
2005) supporting the notion that these communicative forms
provide fairly reliable indicators of the positive and negative
affect, if not actual emotion, that the sender experiences (Keltner
and Kring, 1998) and that a reduction in ambiguity has been
selected for in human emotional signaling (Searcy and Nowicki,
2005). Hirshleifer (1987) and Frank (1988, 2004) proposed that
emotions provide information about people’s behavior propen-
sities (e.g., as guarantors of promises) because they work as
commitment devices. As veridical signals, emotions appear to be
sufficiently reliable in this capacity; emotional displays are more
often than not involuntary and high levels of emotional expres-
sivity are difficult to imitate (Boone and Buck, 2003; Schug et al.,
2010). Thus, the standard human ecology in which “cheap” signal
production and evaluation was designed to operate is not entirely
costless. Rather, because the signaling of emotional states is often
veridical, language should be evaluated and trusted according to
its correspondence with emotional propensities. Under these con-
ditions, detection of deceptive language production would lead
to the imposition of more costs than benefits on the signaler—
effectively making cheaply produced language in the context of
displayed emotions a “costly signal.”
We anticipated that, despite the anonymity we guaranteed par-
ticipants in our laboratory implementation of the trust game
(i.e., ensuring that their partners would not personally identify
or watch them), experiences of emotions would be reliably pro-
duced and recognized by those experiencing them9. We evaluate
9Schniter et al. (2014) also collected data on emotional reactions to trust-
based interaction outcomes using an emotional status survey with multiple
emotion items. They reported floor effects with some of their items: where
participants indicated experiencing the emotion very little or not at all.
However, other emotions in their study showed strong responsiveness to
the reported experience of several emotions (appreciation, con-
tentment, cheerfulness, happiness, pride, believability, anger, dis-
gust, aggravation, frustration, guilt, and shame) and whether
these emotions predict the use of cheaply produced messages,
trust re-extension, and trustworthy or opportunistic behavior.We
hypothesize that these emotions serve the recalibrational func-
tions outlined in Schniter and Shields (2013), and below detail
specific predictions about the triggering of these emotions and
how experienced emotions will correlate with subsequent behav-
iors. Previous studies have shown that the experience of emotions
affects subsequent game behavior (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996;
Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Capra, 2004;
Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Kausel
and Connolly, 2014). The current study contributes to this lit-
erature by examining how trust-relevant integral emotions are
naturally triggered by interaction outcomes and how they inform
trust repair and re-extension in subsequent interactions after trust
is damaged10.
EXPERIMENT DETAILS AND HYPOTHESES
EXPERIMENT DETAILS
Our research was approved by Chapman University’s internal
review board for research with human subjects and informed
consent was obtained from all participants. The research was con-
ducted at Chapman University’s ESI laboratory. 458 participants
(229 pairs) were recruited from a standard campus-wide subject
pool for participation in a session that could last up to 45min.
There were 25 sessions. Each session had between 10 and 24
participants. The average earnings from experiments were $18,
ranging from a $0 to $40, plus $7 for arriving to the session on
time and participating. No participant participated more than
once, and no participant had prior experience with a similar game
environment. During a session, participants seated at visually iso-
lated cubicles interacted with each other anonymously over a
local computer network. Our procedure consisting of three parts,
lasted an average of 35min total, did not involve deception11, and
proceeded as follows. Upon arrival, participants were told that
trust-game outcomes, and based on those results they suggested that future
researchers consider investigating appreciation, happiness, pride, frustration,
anger, and guilt: a selected set with balanced valance that is representative
of the varieties of functions described by their recalibration model of emo-
tions in trust-based interaction. We chose to study those six emotions in
addition to another six which we expected to be roughly synonymous and
therefore similarly activated: cheerfulness (often concomitant with apprecia-
tion), contentment (often concomitant with happiness), believability (often
concomitant with pride), aggravation (often concomitant with frustration),
disgust (often concomitant with anger), and shame (concomitant with guilt
when the offender’s culpability is known).
10A few neuroeconomic studies have shown evidence of neural correlates
of interaction behaviors in ultimatum games (Sanfey et al., 2003) and trust
games (Aimone et al., 2014) that may correspond to emotional experiences
(e.g., see Takahashi et al., 2004) but have not provided direct measures of
whether emotions were actually experienced. Because physiological mea-
sures are often incapable of detecting social emotions (Adolphs, 2002), self-
reports may provide the best, if not only, direct measures of social emotions
(Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009).
11Though we failed to provide information at the outset of our session indi-
cating our intent to provide a repeated trust game opportunity, we provided
participants a reasonable indication of expected total duration for the session
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they would receive $7 for participation, to be paid at the end of the
session along with any additional moneymade during the session.
In the first part of the session, participants received instruc-
tions (see Supplementary Material) for and interacted in an
“experiment”: a veiled trust game with (i) no indication of a
subsequent game to follow and (ii) no statements that the ses-
sion would end at conclusion of that game. The first trust game
is denoted as “veiled” because participants are intentionally not
informed of a subsequent “repetition of the experiment”: a trust
game (repeated with same roles and partners as before) that
would follow in part three12. Participants were assigned to one of
two roles: “Participant A” (investor), or “Participant B” (trustee).
First, the trustee completed the following standardized statement
(which we will refer to below as a promise) by selecting an inte-
ger from 0 to 20: “I (Participant B) promise to transfer back
$___of my income to you (Participant A) if you choose IN.” This
statement was not binding, however. That is, the trustee was not
obligated to transfer back the amount promised to the investor,
and both trustee and investor knew this. The computer conveyed
the trustee’s statement to the investor and then the investor chose
either OUT or IN. If the investor chose OUT, she received $5
and the trustee $0. If the investor chose IN (invest), then the
trustee received $20 (the “income”), after which he selected a
whole dollar amount from $0 to $20 to send back to the investor.
In the second part of the session, after the veiled trust game
(game 1) finished, participants were given an emotional status
survey (see Supplementary Material) that asked them to report
how much they felt each of 20 emotional states (on a five point
scale labeled (1) very slightly or not at all, (2) a little, (3) mod-
erately, (4) quite a bit, (5) extremely) as a consequence of their
recent game interactions and outcomes13. The computer software
presented all emotional states on one screen and in random order.
In the third part of the session, after completing the survey, we
gave our participants additional instructions (see Supplementary
Material) indicating that they had opportunity to participate in a
to which they were recruited, and we made no misleading or counterfac-
tual statements. As such, our procedure does not qualify as the more typical
form of experimental deception (i.e., by commission of lies or exaggerations).
Nevertheless, future studies using similar veiled approaches can improve on
our design by more explicitly clarifying from the outset that a multi-stage
approach is planned. As suggested by the editor, a veiled design could avoid
use of the word “experiment” in describing a single stage and more trans-
parently explain to participants something like, “The session consists of three
stages. Now you will receive the instructions of stage 1. After completion of
stage 1, there will be a stage 2 for which you will receive a new set of instruc-
tions. Finally, following completion of stage 2 there will be a final stage 3 for
which you will receive a new set of instructions.”
12We were motivated to see how people deal with trust re-extension dilemmas
that were not explicitly anticipated as a consequence of certain expecta-
tions (for repeated interaction) but arise through a surprise unveiling. This
required us to first examine trust-based interaction behaviors carried out by
procedurally naïve individuals from behind the veil of ignorance.
13Of the 20 emotions surveyed, we later focus predictions and analyses on
a positive subset (appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, happiness) and
a negative subset (anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration) among investors
(who might have been benefited or exploited and had their trust assured
or damaged), and a positive subset (pride, believability) and a negative
subset (guilt, shame) among trustees (who might have been beneficent or
opportunist and kept or broken their promises).
“repetition of the experiment.” These instructions unveiled that in
game 2, participants would remain in the same roles and interact
with the same partner as in game 1. The instructions also indi-
cated that prior to game 2, the trustee would have an opportunity
to use a “message” box to send a one-way message to the investor.
Trustees were told that “in these messages, no one is allowed to
identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance,”
but that other than these restrictions, trustees could “say anything
in themessage.” If trustees wished not to send amessage they were
instructed to “simply click on the send button without having
typed anything in the message box.” The computer conveyed the
trustee’s message and subsequently the standardized promise to
the investor, and then game 2 proceeded. We specified that game
2, which had the same rules as game 1, was the last experimental
game in the session.
We classified whether messages from our study were apol-
ogy (or not) using an incentivized laboratory coordination game
(Houser and Xiao, 2011). Three coders recruited from the subject
pool and blind to the hypotheses14 were asked to code each mes-
sage based on whether or not it conformed to a broad definition
of apology (“an explicit or implicit acknowledgment of offense”).
All messages without content were coded by all coders as not con-
forming to the definition of apology and 93% of messages with
content were coded by the majority of coders as conforming to
the definition, a “substantial” inter-coder agreement (Kappa of
0.70)15.
HYPOTHESES
An earlier publication in the Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization (Schniter et al., 2013) detailed behavioral results
from games 1 and 2 of this study, with particular attention to the
effects of promises, transfers, messages, and apologies. This earlier
publication did not examine the role of emotion experiences as a
result of these games and gave less attention to the unanticipated
dilemma of trust re-extension that we focus on here.
When deciding whether to re-extend trust, it is impor-
tant for an investor to obtain accurate information about the
propensity of trustees to behave in a trustworthy manner. The
integrity of a trustee’s previous promise (i.e., its signal value)
and the actual returns made on investment (ROI) are indica-
tors of trustworthy character demonstrated in past word and
action or action alone, respectively. Previous studies suggest
that these indicators of trustworthiness, with and without ver-
bal components, may have separate effects on subsequent trust
extension (Schweitzer et al., 2006; Schniter et al., 2013), so we
examine their effects separately 16 . We hypothesize that these
14The instructions for coders, details about how they were paid, and their
earning from the incentivized task are reported in Schniter et al. (2013).
15We use a standard approach from content analysis methodology to calculate
Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater agreement coefficient (Cohen, 1960; Krippendorff,
2004). Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered “Moderate” agree-
ment, and those above 0.60 indicate “Substantial” agreement (Landis and
Koch, 1977).
16These separate effects might come about as a result of reactions to two dis-
tinct phenomena: one being the abuse of language (e.g., issuing a deceptive
promise), and the second being the imposition of economic harm (return-
ing less than invested). These two phenomenon are not necessarily related:
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demonstrations of trustworthy character trigger emotional reac-
tions in investors and trustees facing particular problems and that
the emotions better calibrate them for repeated interaction with
one another.
Specifically, we predict that when the signal value (= return −
promise) of trustworthiness is negative (≥0), the trustee’s psy-
chology implicitly recognizes potential for a subsequent promise
breaker’s (promise keeper’s) cooperation problem and triggers an
emotional reaction: lower (higher) levels of pride and believ-
ability, higher (lower) levels of guilt and shame. When the non-
verbal indicator of trustworthiness, ROI (= return/investment),
is greater (not greater) than one, the trustee implicitly recognizes
potential for a subsequent beneficent (opportunist) cooperation
problem and an emotional reaction is triggered: feeling higher
(lower) levels of pride and believability, lower (higher) levels of
guilt and shame. We expect that together the trustee’s benefi-
cent (opportunist) and promise breaker (promise keeper) emotional
reactions inform the trustee’s propensity to produce spontaneous
re-affirmative or remedial behaviors (constructing messages with
content, constructing wordier messages with higher word count,
and issuing spontaneous apologies) in preparation for a subse-
quent interaction problems.
We predict that when the signal value (= return − promise)
is negative (positive), the investor implicitly recognizes poten-
tial for a subsequent damaged trust (assured trust) cooperation
problem and an emotional reaction is triggered, characterized by
higher (lower) levels of anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration,
and lower (higher) levels of appreciation, contentment, cheerful-
ness, and happiness. When ROI is greater than one (one or less),
the investor experiences a benefited (exploited) emotional reac-
tion: feeling lower (higher) levels of anger, disgust, aggravation,
deceptive promises can be made by trustees providing positive ROIs (observed
in our sample), just as it is possible for promise keeping trustees to provide
negative ROIs (unobserved in our sample).
frustration, and higher (lower) levels of appreciation, content-
ment, cheerfulness, and happiness.
We expect that the propensity to re-extend trust in game
2 is informed by the investor’s emotional reactions to demon-
strated trustworthiness, and some assessment of re-affirmative
and remedial messaging (e.g., whether or not there is a mes-
sage with content, what the word count of message is, whether
or not an apology was issued) by the trustee after the investor’s
initial emotional reactions to game 1 interaction outcomes17.
In Figure 1 we provide a path model visually representing the
above predicted relationships between indicators of trustworthi-
ness, emotional reactions to cooperation problems resulting from
game 1 interaction outcomes, messaging behaviors, and the trust
of re-extension decision. We suspect that investor emotional reac-
tions to trustee re-affirmative and remedial behaviors would also
affect our model, however we did not survey emotional reactions
to either received messages or game 2 promises and are therefore
unable to account for their partial effects.
In addition to the predicted emotional effects on messaging
and trust re-extension summarized above and in Figure 1, we pre-
dict emotional effects on trustee behavior in game 2. Specifically,
we predict a greater propensity to generate trustworthy indica-
tors (e.g., with higher signal value and higher ROI) in game 2
17We suspect that investor emotional reactions to trustee re-affirmative and
remedial behaviors would also affect our model, however we did not sur-
vey emotional reactions to either received messages or game 2 promises and
are therefore unable to account for their partial effects. Our model character-
izes cooperation problems resulting from certain game interaction outcomes
as discrete and binary (e.g., a promise is either kept or broken), and expects
the set of recalibrational emotions they trigger to be distinct (promoting
either re-assuring or remedial messaging, respectively). As such, we evaluate
reports of emotional states and behavioral differences between naturally-
formed groups (e.g., promise keeper vs. promise breaker trustees, beneficent vs.
opportunist trustees, etc.) using two-sample (Welch’s) t-tests for equal means
where appropriate.
FIGURE 1 | Path model of predicted relationship between variables.
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among trustees who reported higher levels of emotional reaction
to game 1—regardless of reaction valence (i.e., higher levels of
feeling proud, believable, guilty, and ashamed). Conversely, we
expect those reporting less emotional reaction to demonstrate less
trustworthy behaviors.
RESULTS
Trust and reciprocity decisions from this game are reported in
detail in Schniter et al. (2013); however, the role of game out-
comes in triggering emotional experiences, and the role of emo-
tional experiences in affecting subsequent behavior propensity
was not reported.
GENERAL OVERVIEW
We found no significant differences between the 25 sessions and
report the joint results of all 458 participants where appropri-
ate. As seen with similar games, we observed a high initial rate
of promised cooperation: 95.2% (218/229) of trustees promised
investors ROI > 1, 3.9% (9/229) promised ROI = 1, and 0.8%
(2/229) promised ROI < 1. In game 1, there was also a high
rate of trust in response to the promises: investors trusted 86.7%
(189/218) of trustees promising ROI> 1 and 22.2% (2/9) promis-
ing ROI = 1, but none of those promising ROI < 1. Trusting
investors from the first game (83.4% of all investors) faced a new
set of challenges when they interacted with the same trustees
again in a second unexpected game. Some of these investors
decided whether to re-extend trust to trustees who cooperated
in the first game by delivering a ROI > 1 (which 88.5% did),
delivering the returns they promised (which 81.2% did), or both.
Other investors decided whether to re-extend trust to trustees that
did not deliver the returns they promised (18.8% of all trusted
trustees), or did not deliver a profitable ROI (11.5% of all trusted
trustees), or both. A subset of those who decided whether to
re-extend trust to non-cooperators, appear to have also been
influenced by their emotional reactions to game 1 and subsequent
message and apology that were sometimes received.
We examined emotional state reports from the 382 partici-
pants who had game 1 interactions where trust was extended.
We found moderately high reliability of internal consistency in
their emotion reports: the Cronbach alpha coefficient is 0.889
for the 10 item Positive Affect Scale and 0.888 for the 10 item
Negative Affect Scale of our 20 item survey, a version of the
PANAS (Watson et al., 1988)18. There was substantial variabil-
ity in individual reports of the 12 emotional states investigated
below19. The average reported emotional state had a mean of 2.21
(median = 1, SD = 1.04), near 2 (“a little”). Ratings on every
emotional state ranged from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to
5 (“extremely”). While the modal report for most (7/12) emo-
tional states was 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) modes were also
seen at 3 for believable and 4 for appreciative, content, cheer-
ful, and happy. Reports of 1 were more frequent for emotional
18Moderately high reliability of internal consistency in PANAS similar to ours
has been reported by Watson et al. (1988) and others (e.g., Mehrabian, 1998;
Roesch, 1998; Kausel and Connolly, 2014).
19We refer to reports of proud, believable, guilty, ashamed, angry, disgusted,
aggravated, frustrated, appreciative, content, cheerful, and happy emotional
states.
states in the negative set than for the positive set (1968/2292
vs. 400/2292, respectively), contributing to significantly lower
intensity of reported negative states (M = 1.27, SD = 0.75) than
positive states (M = 3.15, SD = 1.34) according to Wilcoxon
matched-pairs tests (Z = −15.167, p < 0.001). This pattern of
significantly lower reported negative states was observed in both
investors (Z = −9.446, p < 0.001) and trustees (Z = −11.798,
p < 0.001).
In this paper, we focus on the explanatory power of the
emotional reactions we predict based on recalibrational theory.
Below we report results indicating the predictable and predictive
nature of emotional reactions in this unexpectedly repeated inter-
action. Emotions help explain whether participants attempted
to use cheap signaling reassuringly or remedially, whether
investors decided to re-extend trust, and whether individuals
were more likely to break promises or benefit their exchange
partners.
PREDICTED EMOTIONS
Trustees: emotions predicted by behavior
In this section we evaluate whether the positive and negative
emotional reactions to game 1, reported by naturally occurring
groups of trustees and investors, were predicted by demonstra-
tions of trustworthiness (signal value, ROI) after being trusted
(i.e., invested in). As predicted, after game 1, promise break-
ers reported significantly higher levels of guilt and shame than
promise keepers, and promise keepers reported significantly higher
levels of pride and feeling believable than promise breakers. We
provide bar charts of promise breaker’s and promise keeper’s emo-
tions and report the details of Welch’s t-test comparisons for
equal means in Supplementary Material.
Also, consistent with our prediction of a beneficent (oppor-
tunist) emotional reaction in trustees, beneficent trustees deliv-
ering ROI > 1 in game 1 reported significantly higher levels
of pride and feeling believable. Opportunist trustees reported
significantly higher levels of guilt and shame. We provide bar
charts of beneficent and opportunist trustees’ emotions and
report the details of Welch’s t-test comparisons in Supplementary
Material.
Figure 2 displays bubble plots of trustee emotion intensity (on
a five point scale) and signal value (the difference between game
1 return and promise). Observations are plotted with bubbles,
where the relative size indicates the proportion of observations at
a given point. Table 1 reports results of linear regression models
where the dependent variable is intensity of a specific emotion
(proud, believable, guilty, ashamed) and the independent vari-
able is signal value. We find that trustee emotions are predicted
by signal value of the promise.
Similarly, Figure 3 displays bubble plots of trustee emotion
intensity and ROI. Table 2 reports results of estimating linear
regression models where the dependent variable is intensity of
a specific emotion (proud, believable, guilty, ashamed) and the
independent variable is ROI. We find that trustee emotions are
predicted by ROI. This leads us to our first result:
Result 1: Trustees’ demonstrations of trustworthiness in game
1, by signal value of promise and ROI, predict their subsequent
emotions.
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FIGURE 2 | Bubble plots of trustees’ emotions and Signal value.
Table 1 | Regression of trustees’ emotions on signal value.
Dependent
variable
Proud Believable Guilty Ashamed
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Game 1
return-promise
0.116***
(0.031)
0.164***
(0.028)
−0.138***
(0.016)
−0.084***
(0.012)
Constant 3.429***
(0.105)
3.394***
(0.096)
1.222***
(0.055)
1.110***
(0.042)
R-squared 0.070 0.151 0.280 0.193
Observations 191 191 191 191
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Investors: emotions predicted by behavior
As predicted, investors with damaged trust (where game 1
return < promise) reported significantly higher levels of anger,
disgust, aggravation, and frustration while investors who had
been assured with a return ≥ promise reported significantly
higher levels of appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, and hap-
piness. We provide bar charts of emotions reported by investors
with damaged trust and assured trust and report the details of
Welch’s t-test comparisons in Supplementary Material.
Also, consistent with our prediction, significantly lower levels
of anger, disgust, aggravation, frustration, and significantly higher
levels of appreciation, contentment, cheerfulness, and happiness
were reported after game 1 by investors who had benefited from
a ROI > 1, as opposed to those exploited by lower ROI. We
provide bar charts of emotions reported by investors who had
benefited and been exploited and report the details ofWelch’s t-test
comparisons in Supplementary Material.
Figure 4 display bubble plots of investor emotion intensity and
signal value of promise. Observations are plotted with bubbles,
where the relative size indicates the proportion of observations at
a given point. Table 3 reports results of estimating linear regres-
sion models where the dependent variable is intensity of a specific
emotion (angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, appreciative,
content, cheerful, happy) and the independent variable is signal
value. We find that investor emotions are predicted by signal value
of promise.
Similarly, Figure 5 displays bubble plots of investor emotion
intensity and ROI. Table 4 reports results of estimating linear
regression models where the dependent variable is intensity of a
specific emotion (angry, disgusted, aggravated, frustrated, appre-
ciative, content, cheerful, happy) and the independent variable is
ROI. We find that investor emotions are predicted by ROI. This
leads us to our second result:
Result 2: Trustees’ demonstrations of trustworthiness in game
1, by signal value of promise and ROI, predict investors’ subse-
quent emotions.
PREDICTIVE EMOTIONS
Trustees: spontaneous messaging behaviors predicted by emotions
Using regression analysis, we evaluated the effects of trustees’
emotional reactions to game 1 on measures of their spontaneous
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FIGURE 3 | Bubble plots of trustees’ emotions and ROI.
Table 2 | Regression of trustees’ emotions on ROI.
Dependent
variable
Proud Believable Guilty Ashamed
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Game 1
return/investment
0.709***
(0.185)
0.872***
(0.173)
−0.821***
(0.097)
−0.481***
(0.076)
Constant 2.137***
(0.319)
1.781***
(0.298)
2.722***
(0.167)
1.992***
(0.130)
R-squared 0.072 0.119 0.275 0.176
Observations 191 191 191 191
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
re-affirmative and remedial behaviors (sending a message with
content, the word count sent, and inclusion of a spontaneous
apology). Table 5 reports how the likelihood of message (i.e.,
whether or not they sent a message with content) depends on dif-
ferent emotions. We also controlled for the trustee signal value,
as a broken promise may have been a prime motivator for send-
ingmessages with content. Nevertheless, trustees’ feelings of pride
showed a significant positive relationship predictingmessage (p =
0.027), explaining 2.7% of variance in message. Trustees feeling
believable, guilt, or ashamed were not predictive ofmessage.
Table 6 reports how the message word count depends on dif-
ferent emotions, as well as the trustee signal value. We used a
hurdle model, described by Cameron and Trivedi (1998), since
the process of generating zero values (i.e., no words) is likely
to be different from the process of generating positive values.
Trustees’ pride showed a significant negative relationship (p <
0.001), while feeling believable as well as feelings of guilt and
shame showed a significant positive relationship (p = 0.010, p <
0.001 and p < 0.001), with word count. Next, we estimated a
regression to evaluate the combined effects of the above four
emotional reactions on message word count. We can reject the
hypothesis that all four emotions (specification 5 in Table 6) have
no effect onword count (X2 = 62.20, p < 0.001, df = 4). As a set,
the four emotions predicted 5.5% of the variance in message word
count.
Next, Table 7 reports logistic regression analyses evaluating the
effects of trustee emotional reactions to game 1 on spontaneous
apology. Trustees’ feelings of pride did not show a significant rela-
tionship predicting apology. On the other hand, trustees feeling
believable showed a significant negative relationship (p = 0.019)
while feelings of guilt and shame showed a significant positive
relationship (p = 0.000 and p = 0.005) predicting apology. Next,
we estimated a logit model to evaluate the combined effects of
the above four emotional reactions on likelihood of apology.
We can reject the hypothesis that all four emotions (specifica-
tion 5 in Table 7) have no effect on the likelihood of apology
(X2 = 19.56, p < 0.001, df = 4). The Cox and Snell R2 indicates
that together the four emotions explain 41.8% of the apology
variance.
Result 3: Trustees’ emotions’ predict their subsequent messag-
ing behavior such as issuing messages with content, with longer
word count, and with apology.
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FIGURE 4 | Bubble plots of investors’ emotions and Signal value.
Investors: trust re-extension predicted by emotions
In this section we evaluate whether investors’ trust re-extension in
game 2 was predicted by their emotional reactions to game 1 and
by measures of spontaneous re-affirmative or remedial messaging
behavior demonstrated after game 1.
Table 8 reports logistic regression analyses evaluating the
effects of trustee emotional reactions to game 1 on trust re-
extension in game 2. We also include one of several measures
of messaging behaviors (i.e., message, word count, or apology)
that investors were targeted by, as well as the trustee signal value
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Table 3 | Regression of investors’ emotions on signal value.
Dependent variable Angry Disgusted Aggravated Frustrated Appreciative Content Cheerful Happy
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Game 1 return-promise −0.232***
(0.019)
−0.188***
(0.017)
−0.208***
(0.019)
−0.193***
(0.018)
0.227***
(0.029)
0.209***
(0.026)
0.181***
(0.026)
0.202***
(0.026)
Constant 1.372***
(0.066)
1.212***
(0.057)
1.290***
(0.063)
1.338***
(0.063)
3.455***
(0.098)
3.550***
(0.087)
3.031***
(0.090)
3.296***
(0.088)
R-squared 0.432 0.397 0.400 0.365 0.248 0.263 0.200 0.244
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
from game 1 and new promises (specifically, the returned amount
promised) in game 2. In estimating these models, we do not con-
sider a model with multiple measures of messaging behaviors
because it would introduce multicollinearity20.
We can reject the hypothesis that all eight emotions in spec-
ification (1) of Table 8 have no effect on the likelihood of trust
re-extension (X2 = 21.54, p = 0.005, df = 8, Cox Snell R2 =
0.178). Overall, it appears that the most important emotion
predicting trust re-extension is the experience of frustration.
Specification (2) of Table 8 considers these emotions, as well as
the trustee game 1 signal value and new promises in game 2
to predict trust re-extension (X2 = 24.06, p = 0.007, df = 10,
Cox Snell R2 = 0.203). The change in R2 between specification
(2) and specification (1) indicates that signal value and new
promises explain an additional 2.5% of the variance. Specification
(3) of Table 8 additionally considers message to predict trust
re-extension (X2 = 27.43, p = 0.004, df = 11, Cox Snell R2 =
0.288). The change in R2 between specification (3) and specifi-
cation (2) indicates that message explains an additional 8.5% of
the variance. Similar conclusions can be drawn for specification
(4) and specification (5).
Result 4: Investors’ emotions, trustees’ messaging targeting
investors, and the signal value of game 1 promise predict subse-
quent game 2 trust re-extension.
Trustees: signal value and ROI in game 2 predicted by emotions
In this section we evaluate whether trustees’ emotional reac-
tions to game 1 are predictive of game 2 demonstrations of
trustworthiness (signal value and ROI in game 2).
For previously trusted trustees who were re-extended trust
again in game 2, we estimated linear regression models, reported
in Tables 9A,B, where the dependent variable is the signal value
of game 2 promise (the difference between game 2 return and
promise) and the independent variables are the trustee emotional
reactions to game 1 (pride, believability, guilt, shame), as well
as the signal value in game 1 (to control for individual effects).
Table 9A uses a sub-sample of game 1 promise keepers and
Table 9B uses a sub-sample of game 1 promise breakers. There
20Message, word count, and apology are inter-related: whether or not there is a
message (with content) is related toword count; whether or not there is apology
is related to word count and tomessage.
are two interesting results that emerge from comparing these two
tables. First, the signal value in game 1 and the signal value in game
2 are positively correlated for promise breakers (Table 9A) and
negatively correlated for promise keepers (Table 9B). Second, it
appears that emotions play a more important role in regulating
the subsequent behavior of promise keepers than promise break-
ers. Table 9B shows that trustees feelings of pride in game 1 is
positively correlated with signal value in game 2, trustees feelings
of shame is negatively correlated with signal value in game 2.
Next, we estimated linear regression models, reported in
Tables 10A,B, where the dependent variable is game 2 ROI (game
2 return divided by investment) and the independent variables are
the trustee emotional reactions to game 1, as well as game 1 ROI
(to control for individual effects). Table 10A uses a sub-sample of
game 1 promise keepers and Table 10B uses a sub-sample of game
1 promise breakers. The only significant emotion predicting ROI
is shame experienced by promise keepers (Table 10B).
Result 5: Trustees’ emotions predict their subsequent demon-
strations of trustworthiness such as signal value and ROI in
game 2.
DISCUSSION
Emotional experiences reported by our participants explain as
much as 30.1% of their subsequent behavior. That the stud-
ied emotions did not predict more of the observed variance in
messaging or trust re-extension may be a consequence of the
unexplained variance in reported experiences of emotions. Our
model based on game 1 antecedents explained between 20 and
47% of the variance in reports of each of the 12 emotional states
studied, with more variance explained for the negative emotion
states that were generally experienced with lower intensity. Below
we consider whether some of the variance in emotional reports
might be explained by differing interpretations of the emotion
labels, design limitations of the survey instrument, or deliberately
compromised reporting fidelity.
People who are asked to rate single emotions may not be
able to accurately describe their emotional states (Ellsworth
and Tong, 2006) if emotion experiences are more often
and accurately described with multiple words (Izard, 1977),
or with different words among different people. While we
acknowledge that language could present problems for this
research and have no controls, the success of previous research
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FIGURE 5 | Bubble plots of investors’ emotions and ROI.
on self-reported emotions in conjunction with experimen-
tal games (Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Hopfensitz and Reuben,
2009) gave us encouragement in using our instrument to pur-
sue measures of self-reported emotions following an economic
game.
Data quality could also have been affected if our stimulus
primed participants to experience specific emotions (e.g., as a
consequence of experimenter demand) or if they were incen-
tivized to make untruthful reports. Demand effects to provide
inflated reports of the emotional states specifically studied in this
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Table 4 | Regression of investors’ emotions on ROI.
Dependent variable Angry Disgusted Aggravated Frustrated Appreciative Content Cheerful Happy
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Game 1 return/investment −1.508***
(0.109)
−1.171***
(0.099)
−1.346***
(0.105)
−1.324***
(0.101)
1.615***
(0.161)
1.497***
(0.142)
1.366***
(0.147)
1.422***
(0.146)
Constant 4.104***
(0.187)
3.341***
(0.170)
3.728***
(0.181)
3.724***
(0.174)
0.553**
(0.278)
0.863***
(0.244)
0.590**
(0.254)
0.738***
(0.251)
R-squared 0.505 0.425 0.464 0.477 0.346 0.371 0.313 0.334
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Constants are not reported.
Table 5 | Regression ofmessage on trustees’ emotions.
Dependent
variable
Message Message Message Message Message
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proud 0.300** 0.330**
(0.136) (0.146)
Believable 0.184 0.120
(0.147) (0.156)
Guilty 0.344 0.562
(0.310) (0.429)
Ashamed 0.291 0.029
(0.402) (0.539)
Game 1 −0.052 −0.046 0.028 0.006 0.003
return-promise (0.064) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066) (0.076)
Constant 0.429 0.800 1.002** 1.090** −0.761
(0.465) (0.513) (0.405) (0.474) (0.845)
R-squared 0.027 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.047
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
**Significant at 5%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
report is unlikely because we surveyed a larger set of 20 emo-
tional states and did not reveal the subset of emotional states
that we were particularly interested in analyzing. Another con-
cern is that if participants did not view the emotion survey as
“incentive compatible,” they may have been motivated to answer
untruthfully. Ameta-review by Camerer andHogarth (1999) con-
cludes that there is no clear evidence that additional financial
incentives would improve the quality of responses in a simple
survey task like ours. In fact, for short tasks like these surveys
that people are known to voluntarily complete without problem
(because they have sufficient intrinsic motivation to do so), an
attempt at increasing participation via financial incentives often
“backfires” with counter-intentional effects (e.g., Mellstrom and
Johannesson, 2008). Nevertheless, wary of the possibility that
participants may have been incentivized to use efficiency tactics
to expediently complete the survey (such as by quickly marking
Table 6 | Regression of word count on trustees’ emotions.
Dependent
variable
Word
count
Word
count
Word
count
Word
count
Word
count
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proud −0.046***
(0.015)
−0.040**
(0.017)
Believable 0.042**
(0.016)
0.081***
(0.017)
Guilty 0.160***
(0.024)
0.206***
(0.036)
Ashamed 0.132***
(0.031)
−0.064
(0.045)
Game 1
return-promise
−0.035***
(0.005)
−0.047***
(0.006)
−0.016**
(0.006)
−0.028***
(0.006)
−0.023***
(0.007)
Constant 2.881***
(0.057)
2.575***
(0.061)
2.514***
(0.038)
2.569***
(0.042)
2.386***
(0.093)
R-squared 0.029 0.027 0.044 0.032 0.055
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
all responses the same), we reviewed our data and found no cases
of such behavior.
CONCLUSION
In this study we examined how participants who were given
no indication of opportunity for subsequent interactions, expe-
rienced emotions after participating in a trust game, and how
such emotions influenced subsequent behaviors when another
opportunity for trust-based exchange unexpectedly arose. We
found that emotions triggered by trust-based interaction out-
comes are predictable and also predict subsequent messaging,
apology, trust re-extension, and demonstrated trustworthiness.
These findings advance our understanding of human behavior
and they contribute to several areas of research.
First, our study provides support for the recalibrational the-
ory of emotions. According to this theory, new information
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Table 7 | Regression of apology on trustees’ emotions.
Dependent
variable
Apology Apology Apology Apology Apology
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proud −0.243
(0.169)
0.162
(0.227)
Believable −0.437**
(0.187)
−0.342
(0.235)
Guilty 1.283***
(0.293)
1.371***
(0.420)
Ashamed 1.081***
(0.389)
−0.193
(0.493)
Game 1
Return-Promise
−0.407***
(0.083)
−0.366***
(0.083)
−0.291***
(0.081)
−0.346***
(0.080)
−0.262***
(0.085)
Constant −1.535***
(0.576)
−0.973*
(0.589)
−4.131***
(0.544)
−3.576***
(0.551)
−3.486***
(1.119)
R-squared 0.292 0.312 0.405 0.328 0.418
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
about outcomes triggers emotions, and, when experienced, these
emotions recalibrate the system regulating one’s propensity for
subsequent behavior. In support of this theory, we find that
positive emotions experienced after successful trust-based inter-
action motivate the investor to trust the trustee’s cheap signals
and re-extend trust, and motivate the beneficent, promise keeper
trustees to issue shorter re-affirmativemessages (word countM =
6.33, SD = 10.970)21 and demonstrate more trustworthiness.
Alternatively, a trustee’s negative emotional reaction to acting
untrustworthy (breaking a promise and exploiting the investor),
motivates remedial efforts like longer messages (word countM =
19.06, SD = 19.031) and apology targeting the affected investor.
Second, our study provides an explanation for why “cheap-
talk” (i.e., communication not necessarily affecting incentives,
Farrell and Rabin, 1996) is produced despite normative predic-
tion, and why these kinds of messages are often effective. Though
cheap-to-produce signals are not guaranteed to be reliable on
their own and thus unexpected to persuade receivers (Grafen,
1990; Zahavi, 1993), they are frequently used by humans in the
21Space precludes a full content analysis, but cursory inspection reveals that
these messages tend to be re-affirmative—calling attention to the successful
exchange and intention to repeat it. Examples include “teamwork!,” “same
deal.,” “same as last time:),” “we’re a good pair. I don’t know what else to say
haha.,” “same thing?,” “lets do this!,” “Pleasure doing business with you,” “I
will keep it equal like last time,” “Let’s just do the same transfer again,” “Let’s
do the same. . . It worked and we both made some money!!!,” “Same deal as
before sounds about right, in my opinion,” “Let’s do the same thing, that way
we both get the max amount of money,” “Same thing again. We both benefit.,”
“I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us and it’s
fair:) Thanks for being great!,” “Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶and do
the same thing.,” “well we worked together so far- want to do it again? at least
we’ll both make more than $5.” Interested readers are encouraged to further
examine the message content in Supplementary Material.
Table 8 | Regression of trust re-extension on investors’ emotions.
Dependent Game 2 Game 2 Game 2 Game 2 Game 2
variable investment investment investment investment investment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Angry −0.068 −0.113 0.038 0.004 −0.095
(0.325) (0.352) (0.380) (0.368) (0.342)
Disgusted −0.062 −0.002 −0.308 −0.380 −0.230
(0.360) (0.386) (0.415) (0.441) (0.418)
Aggravated 0.467 0.709 0.899 0.578 0.507
(0.516) (0.566) (0.599) (0.566) 0.507
Frustrated −0.858* −0.929* −0.934* −0.695 −0.829*
(0.471) (0.490) (0.516) (0.491) (0.504)
Appreciative 0.041 −0.094 −0.077 −0.015 −0.057
(0.307) (0.333) (0.347) (0.328) (0.339)
Content −0.101 −0.088 −0.034 −0.038 −0.016
(0.321) (0.327) (0.353) (0.335) (0.344)
Cheerful 0.570 0.526 0.491 0.480 0.545
(0.375) (0.382) (0.403) (0.385) (0.395)
Happy 0.013 0.072 0.095 −0.025 −0.019
(0.416) (0.431) (0.436) (0.439) (0.432)
Game 1 0.157* 0.202** 0.165 0.268*
return-promise (0.094) (0.100) (0.103) (0.138)
Game 2 0.171 0.186 0.155 0.198
promise (0.118) (0.122) (0.121) (0.126)
Message 1.994***
(0.589)
Word count 0.053**
(0.026)
Apology 2.635**
(1.182)
Constant 1.795 0.386 −1.319 0.167 0.237
(1.230) (1.584) (1.748) (1.664) (1.714)
R-squared 0.178 0.203 0.288 0.239 0.255
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
form of spoken or written words to negotiate trust between
individuals with conflicting interests (Lachmann et al., 2001).
Our study suggests that cheap-to-produce messages are reliable
because they are influence by predictable emotions in reliable
ways. For example, we find that the predicted positive emotional
responses by trustees decrease the likelihood of apology and the
length of message. On the other hand, predicted negative emo-
tional responses increase the likelihood of apology and the length
of message. Not only do emotions predict the use of cheap-
to-produce re-affirmative and remedial messages, but they also
predict the subsequent behavior of trustees. In principal, investors
who anticipate or have access to the dynamics of these emo-
tional responses and communicative intentions should be able to
reliably predict the behavior of trustees based on their messages.
Finally, our study shows that remedial behaviors (spontaneous
messaging with apology) can facilitate the rebuilding of damaged
trust, with emotions guiding behavioral propensities. This is an
important finding, given that breaches of trust are a common
problem in social and economic relationships, and corporate life
(Robinson and Rousseau, 1994; Barnett, 2003).
For the past couple millennia scholars have recognized that
emotions indeed matter in our everyday lives, but have argued
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Table 9A | Regression of game 2 Signal Value on promise breaking
trustees’ emotions.
Dependent Game 2 Game 2 Game 2 Game 2
variable return-promise return-promise return-promise return-promise
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Game 1 0.716*** 0.727*** 0.766*** 0.757***
return-promise (0.210) (0.207) (0.211) (0.216)
Proud −0.609
(0.745)
Believable −1.089
(0.857)
Guilty 0.943
(0.807)
Ashamed 0.734
(0.974)
Constant −1.19 −0.527 −4.580* −3.647
(2.301) (2.242) (2.371) (2.192)
R-squared 0.274 0.294 0.289 0.272
Observations 36 36 36 36
*Significant at 10%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 9B | Regression of game 2 Signal Value on promise keeping
trustees’ emotions.
Dependent
variable
Game 2
return-promise
Game 2
return-promise
Game 2
return-promise
Game 2
return-promise
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Game 1
return-promise
−0.863**
(0.415)
−0.887**
(0.417)
−0.774*
(0.441)
−0.562
(0.460)
Proud 0.368*
(0.208)
Believable 0.244
(0.233)
Guilty −0.590
(0.657)
Ashamed −1.507*
(0.884)
Constant −2.745***
(0.787)
−2.303***
(0.871)
−0.786
(0.779)
0.131
(0.962)
R-squared 0.049 0.037 0.035 0.048
Observations 155 155 155 155
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
over issues of whether and how emotions guide behavior. Much
progress has been made toward understanding how emotions are
triggered, and what their effects are on behavior. Our study con-
tributes to this discussion by providing evidence that trust-based
interaction outcomes trigger emotions in predictable ways that,
in turn, influence our propensity toward subsequent behaviors.
One drawback of our study is that we elicited emotions using self-
reports. Future research can overcome this limitation by focusing
Table 10A | Regression of game 2 ROI on promise breaking trustees’
emotions.
Dependent
variable
Game 2
return/
investment
Game 2
return/
investment
Game 2
return/
investment
Game 2
return/
investment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Game 1
return-promise
0.720***
(0.233)
0.699***
(0.233)
0.760***
(0.237)
0.759***
(0.238)
Proud −0.057
(0.126)
Believable −0.119
(0.148)
Guilty 0.102
(0.138)
Ashamed 0.107
(0.165)
Constant 0.519
(0.387)
0.624
(0.387)
0.105
(0.461)
0.162
(0.433)
R-squared 0.230 0.241 0.238 0.235
Observations 36 36 36 36
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 10B | Regression of game 2 ROI on promise keeping trustees’
emotions.
Dependent
variable
Game 2
return/
investment
Game 2
return/
investment
Game 2
return/
investment
Game 2
return/
investment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Game 1
return-promise
0.611***
(0.225)
0.627***
(0.226)
0.618***
(0.225)
0.681***
(0.223)
Proud 0.070
(0.045)
Believable 0.024
(0.050)
Guilty −0.208
(0.133)
Ashamed −0.420**
(0.169)
Constant 0.232
(0.433)
0.365
(0.444)
0.701
(0.445)
0.797*
(0.432)
R-squared 0.064 0.050 0.064 0.086
Observations 155 155 155 155
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
on objective neurological, physiological, and behavioral measures
of emotional states.
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